Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice

dc.contributor.author	Garvie, D	en
dc.contributor.author	Keeler, A	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-06-06T06:42:33Z
dc.date.available	2014-06-06T06:42:33Z
dc.date.issued	1994	en
dc.identifier.issn	00472727	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://62.217.125.90/xmlui/handle/123456789/685
dc.relation.uri	http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-0000613363&partnerID=40&md5=51dd8a5ccd199061f0d2833738bae765	en
dc.title	Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.publicationDate	1994	en
heal.abstract	This paper extends the economic literature on the incomplete enforcement of social regulation by incorporating regulatory choice in an institutional environment of limited regulatory resources and powers. We show how regulatory decisions determine the structure of incentives faced by regulated firms. Our results indicate that the expense of monitoring relative to the regulator's power to levy penalties helps to explain the differences between 'compliance' and 'deterrence' enforcement styles. We find that in most circumstances firms with higher abatement costs will receive a larger share of regulatory resources and thus face higher penalties than firms with lower costs. © 1994.	en
heal.journalName	Journal of Public Economics	en
dc.identifier.issue	1	en
dc.identifier.volume	55	en
dc.identifier.spage	141	en
dc.identifier.epage	162	en