| dc.contributor.author |
Kampas, A |
en |
| dc.contributor.author |
Melfou, K |
en |
| dc.contributor.author |
Aftab, A |
en |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2014-06-06T06:52:25Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2014-06-06T06:52:25Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013 |
en |
| dc.identifier.issn |
11092580 |
en |
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://62.217.125.90/xmlui/handle/123456789/6002 |
|
| dc.relation.uri |
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84899823982&partnerID=40&md5=eb2f1c798806ba55f016b5f37943b709 |
en |
| dc.subject |
Complex externalities |
en |
| dc.subject |
Incentive compatibility |
en |
| dc.subject |
Moral hazard |
en |
| dc.subject |
Spatial externalities |
en |
| dc.subject |
State dependent linear ambient tax |
en |
| dc.subject |
Voluntary schemes |
en |
| dc.title |
Designing regulatory policies for complex externalities: The case of agricultural pollution |
en |
| heal.type |
journalArticle |
en |
| heal.publicationDate |
2013 |
en |
| heal.abstract |
The paper examines the issue of designing and implementing policy measures to control complex agricultural externalities. Complex externalities refer to the situation where a production (firm on firm) externality coexists with a detrimental (firm on society) externality. The paper identifies the optimal solution for complex externalities, which is a combination of spatially differentiated taxes. However, severe information requirements render the first-best policy infeasible. Finally, a likely voluntary scheme based on firm self-report is examined which may enforce firm compliance with the optimal policy. |
en |
| heal.publisher |
Greek Association of Agricultural Economists |
en |
| heal.journalName |
Agricultural Economics Review |
en |
| dc.identifier.issue |
2 |
en |
| dc.identifier.volume |
14 |
en |
| dc.identifier.spage |
75 |
en |
| dc.identifier.epage |
88 |
en |