dc.contributor.author |
Paudel, KP |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Lohr, L |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Martin Jr ,NR |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2014-06-06T06:43:29Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2014-06-06T06:43:29Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
1998 |
en |
dc.identifier.issn |
0308521X |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0308-521X(97)00050-4 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://62.217.125.90/xmlui/handle/123456789/1305 |
|
dc.subject.other |
crop production |
en |
dc.subject.other |
economic analysis |
en |
dc.subject.other |
land tenure |
en |
dc.subject.other |
negotiation process |
en |
dc.subject.other |
United States, Albama |
en |
dc.title |
Optimal input cost sharing for tenants: Implications for negotiating efficiency |
en |
heal.type |
journalArticle |
en |
heal.identifier.primary |
10.1016/S0308-521X(97)00050-4 |
en |
heal.publicationDate |
1998 |
en |
heal.abstract |
We demonstrate the influence of optimal input cost sharing on the riskneutral tenant's input choice and income. We determine the share arrangements that generate an efficient outcome compared with the owner-operator's input choices. In an illustration with a corn-peanut rotation in Alabama, we use parametric programming to determine the tenant's optimal input cost share for corn fertilizer, a key input, while varying the output shares and cost shares of other inputs. The tenant's income above variable costs is highest when the cost share permits the level of fertilizer to reach the efficient level, at which the optimal fertilizer cost share is higher than both the output share and the cost share for other inputs. Owners and tenants may benefit from negotiating shares rather than applying simple rules setting all input cost and output shares equal. |
en |
heal.journalName |
Agricultural Systems |
en |
dc.identifier.issue |
1 |
en |
dc.identifier.volume |
57 |
en |
dc.identifier.doi |
10.1016/S0308-521X(97)00050-4 |
en |
dc.identifier.spage |
1 |
en |
dc.identifier.epage |
11 |
en |